Prophet of the Way <afu@wta.att.ne.jp> writes:

> I found this site by a group of historians that call themselves
> 'liberal' (jiyuu shugi shikan):

I pursued the link you offered because it puzzled me that a Japanese
historical organization characterize itself as "liberal"--a term that
really derives from the context of U.S. political ideology.

In the U.S., the technically correct meaning of the word "liberal" is
a society in which there is minimal constraint on trade. This sense is
akin to the position of old fashioned classical political economy, of
traditional (vs. neo-) political conservatism and to
anarchism. However, the term is more often used in the U.S. to suggest
quite the opposite: an active intervention by government to address
economic and social problems.

Because the term has this contradictory meaning peculiar to
U.S. political ideology, I was curious as to where this jiyuu shugi
shikan organization stood.

As best I can make out (being unable to read Japanese), jiyuu shugi
shikan describes itself as "liberalist." There is no such word, and I
could not see that the organization troubled to define it. So this
left me in the dark concerning the organization's agenda. However, I
assume that an organization that fixates just on Japan's role in the
Second World War is probably not scholarly or academic, but more is
more likely simply Professor Fujioka Nobukatsu's personal hobby
horse. It turns out that this reservation is correct.

Why do I worry about this? I need to have some idea of the credibility
of an organization or individual that puts forward a position on such
a delicate issue as the Rape of Nanjing.

So I take a look at this Fujioka Nobukatsa. I find that he is not a
professional historian, but an education teacher, and came into the
public light by objecting to a "masochistic" view of Japan's activity
in World War II that is found in history books. In other words, he is
not addressing the issue in scholarly terms, but politically.

From the Daily Yomiuri (18 September 1997):

  many historians and educators who have studied the crimes committed
  by the Imperial Army in World War II refute Nobakatsa's opinions.

  The debate grew more intense last year when Nobakatsa and his
  supporters petitioned the Education Ministry to delete references to
  "comfort women" from middle school history textbooks.

  An expert on Japanese war crimes, noted that other Asian nations
  perceive the views of Nobukatsa and his followers to be indicative of
  rising Japanese nationalism.

  Fujioka: I was a leftist until the Gulf War in 1991. But during the
  war, I decided that Japanese pacifism, based on Article 9 of the
  Constitution, was useless and self-righteous. I was very sorry to
  see the Japanese government's contribution to the war was limited to
  financial support. 

  Fujioka: During my stay in the United States in 1991, the Soviet
  Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. At that time, I believed
  there was a need to reconsider history education in Japan, which had
  been influenced by socialism. 

  Yoshida: This prompted the Japanese government to officially admit
  its responsibilities and apologize for the Imperial Army's war
  crimes to its neighbors. But some people, who believed the issue was
  already solved, became confused and frustrated when the government
  neglected to discuss the issue with the populace and gain a
  consensus on the matter before issuing a statement of apology. 
  Professor Fujioka's movement has been welcomed by such people who
  are disillusioned with Japan's diplomacy toward other Asian
  countries. 

  When Fujioka called for a review of history education in 1995, I
  didn't fully disagree with his demand. I also felt it was necessary
  to reconsider the curriculum because I knew Japanese students were
  less informed about contemporary history than students of other
  Asian countries. I saw Fujioka's movement as the unique attempt of
  educators who were dissatisfied with "peace education," which
  emphasizes the emotional misery of war. But now, it has become a
  political campaign--far from a teachers' movement. 

What do I infer from this Yomiuii article? 

a) Fujioka's views, which apparently is a main source for the call for
a revision of history school texts are sharply contested by
scholars. However, it is clear that this controversy is really not
about the past, nor even about textbook revision, but about current
politics, a wish to redirect Japanese foreign policies to the far
right. The textbook issue is a red herring that can only obscure
things, and it has nothing to do with scholarship.

b) His rise to prominence was the result of his taking a political
position, not the result of scholarly research. The issue should be
debated in terms of Japanese foreign policy, the military and economic
realities of East Asia today, and what might help re-stimulate the
Japanese economy. The atrocities committed during World War II are
irrelevant here and meant only to divert attention from the real
issues.

c) Fujioka came to the U.S. in 1991 for some reason and also for some
reason chose to identify strongly with U.S. policy in the Mid-east
Gulf. Just why begs for explanation. He wished Japan would offer more
substantial military support to the U.S. in a war that should not have
really engaged his interest. It is hard to reconcile his claim to have
been a socialist with this attitude (I'm sure none of his socialist
acquaintances in the U.S. supported the Gulf War). Just as it becomes
clear that his use of the term "liberal" is intended as a smokescreen,
perhaps that applies to his "socialism" as well.

d) I get the impression from the historian Yoshida, that to the extent
the government did apologize for World War II misdeeds, it upset
nationalists. It seems these nationalists are willing to re-arm Japan
in order to promote Japan's economic interests in East Asia my
military means. I don't know what other interpretation there can be,
and if my guess is correct, it simply means Japan would like have a
second chance to win World War II.   

e) I infer that because his effort to revise textbooks included a
strong nationalist element that made other scholars uncomfortable,
Fujioka politicized the issue in order to gain support of
ultra-nationalists. On other words, it aims are political and nothing
to do with education. While this is only an inference, if it is not
the case, his behavior becomes very strange. 

From a web site on the textbook controversy (Washington University,
Saint Louis):

  Fujioka Nobukatsu champions the conservative, exclusionary side of
  the debate, claiming that representations of history should increase
  a citizen's pride in the nation. A member of the "Liberal View of
  History Study Group," Fujioka promotes rightist, nationalist views
  disguised as "liberal" so as to influence students, teachers, and
  academics. Fujioka does not believe history should be subject to
  interpretation; instead history is "subject to the ultimate moral
  imperative of whether or not it serves to inculcate a sense of pride
  in being Japanese." Fujioka believes that history makes no
  distinction between the truth and conjecture, thus necessitating a
  "censoring" in historical texts. Slanderous, uncensored, textbooks
  simply have no worth, according to Fujioka, for they only serve to
  provide a "self tormenting historical perspective," and does not
  allow Japanese children to foster a sense of nationalism because of
  a lack of pride in their own nation's history. Critics, such as
  Aaron Gerow, suggest that Nobukatsu's views are masochistic, for he
  enjoys "making oneself the victim of injustice so as to justify
  one's own existence. Fujioka favors the denial of the truth over the
  inclusion of shameful facts because of the detrimental affect of the
  truth on the Japanese sense of nationalism.

I conclude with the following points:

a) An "exclusionary" view, or ultra-nationalism, naturally alienates
other Asian states. It is the opposite of seeking compromise and
reconciliation. It is not a question of what really happened during
World War II, but the issue of a policy today that would have Japan
thumb its nose at other Asian countries, that seems associated with
re-militarization, and which logically is tied to imperial expansion,
presumably as a way out of Japan's economic doldrums. Whether this is
a fair inference is what should be discussed, not textbook content,
which is secondary.

b) Regarding history not being subject to interpretation. This is
utter nonsense. It is not true of historiography; is an impossible and
undesirable goal in practice; and few if any professional historians
would take such a suggestion seriously. Interpretation is the basis of
scientific historiography and makes possible for the study of history
to have truth value. There are tests by which to assess the truth
value of explanatory hypotheses, and if we deny hypotheses, we deny
the possibility of truth. Otherwise, historical study becomes merely a
kind of entertainment, and as such would be unworthy of being taught
at all.

c) Fujioka suggests the purpose of historical study is to inculcate
nationalism. Initially, this characterization of Fujioka makes no
sense, for if history is not subject to interpretation, how then can
it be used to serve nationalism? Apparently Fujioka slips into the
postmodern cesspool to insist that historical study has nothing to do
with truth; it is not, like a science, a search for truth, but merely
propaganda. This view is sometimes said to characterize the
Neo-Conservative agenda (and is sometimes characterized as being
fascist), for it aims to prevent the public from discovering truth and
therefore foolishly constrain the necessary global expansion of
national power. In other words, it is a view quite hostile to
education.

d) But the really important point here is that if Fujioka denies that
historiography entails interpretation, then nothing he says about the
past should be taken seriously, for it can have no truth value. The
purpose of Japanese textbooks is not to educate youngsters, but to
make them ultra-nationalist supporters of Japan's recovering
militarism. The issue is whether East Asia states are willing to
accept a re-instituted Japanese empire built by conquest, not the
number who died during the Rape of Nanking. That is only a red
herring.

-- 
 
       Haines Brown
       KB1GRM